Speaking of conspiracy theories...

This is apparently pretty popular online right now. I saw it via Johannes Goldberg (Or John Goldmountain if you prefer) :)

Stanley Kubrick's The Shining is actually a secret admission of his faking the moon-landing for NASA.

Berchmans! NO!!!!! Come back!!!!

American man purportedly escapes to North Korea, joins NK Army to avoid becoming "cannon fodder of capitalist military"

(I kid, I kid Berchmans)

Majority Rules

From Ezra Klein, this graph shows the rising importance of the filibuster in the U.S. Senate. Quite troubling:

Who Knew?

this John Cassidy piece in the New Yorker has caused a stir among professional economists and policy makers. In case you missed it, the article presents us with a compendium of interviews he conducted with prominent University of Chicago economists. Famed free market ideologues like Gary Becker, Richard Posner, and Eugene Fama gives us their broad brush interpretations of the causes of the recent financial crisis.

Along the way, Cassidy does his best to remind his readers that the financial crisis is a priori proof of the failure of a free-market ideology, particularly the brand of economic thinking coming out of the Chicago School. (He goes so far as to label Eugene Fama a market “fundamentalist,” a familiar invective lobbed at those who express any hint of skepticism toward the healing powers of government.) Cassidy also suggests that one of the school’s brightest stars, Richard Posner, who recently “converted” to the John Maynard Keynes weltanschauung, should be the poster child for other free market economists. In other words, be warned: the Chicago School is losing its intellectual grip among serious thinkers and policy makers.

Who knew?

Well first of all, it makes no sense that Richard Posner’s putative conversion is even a story. He is, after all, a prominent judge and economist who studies and writes about the intersection between law and economics. And he’s done that really, really well his whole career. He is not – like Keynes was – a macroeconomist who studies interest rates, unemployment, or even money. That big difference should alarm sensible readers.

But who cares? For Cassidy and the editors at the New Yorker, Posner’s profile hits all the right marks: an economist! (doesn’t matter what kind) from the University of Chicago! (guilt by association) who converted! (it was a splendid ceremony). The editors must’ve been champing at the bit – this story is so compelling, it must be true!

Secondly, and most importantly, the part of Cassidy’s piece that’s most alarming concerns the Chicago School’s ostensible fall from policy making grace. Cassidy tells us that free market thinking was the paramount ideology governing policy making over the last couple decades, since at least the Reagan administration. And that ideology was part and parcel of the cause of the recent financial crisis.

Well, there’s an easy way to test this claim. Unfortunately, neither Cassidy nor his editors at the New Yorker bother to do so. Stanford University economist John Taylor, on the other hand, does the heavy lifting for them. And anyone who cares about getting closer to the truth should pay attention.

Here’s Taylor's graph depicting the number of PhD appointees since 1980 from both Cambridge (Harvard or MIT) and Chicago to the CEA (the president’s governing body of super-smart economists who guide economic policy making in this country):

Wow. It seems to me that the chart illustrates the complete opposite of Cassidy's claims. Remember, “in the areas of regulation, trade, anti-trust laws, taxes, interest rates, and welfare, Chicago thinking greatly influenced policymaking in the U.S. and many other parts of the world.” Who knew that you can have zero Chicago School economists in the CEA and still have a great influence shaping policy? The question then is, how do they do it?

The answer? They don’t. You see, John Cassidy and the editors of the New Yorker know that compelling stories are much better than the data, even if these stories are mostly made up.

Defending Cass Sunstein's Conspiracy Theory Article

I'm angry. Yes, it's true -- no amount of listening to a sappy Bollywood song has calmed me, because, first, I stayed up until 1 a.m. to read Cass Sunstein's conspiracy theory article and, second, because VM -- and, surprisingly, Glenn Greenwald -- almost had me worried that I was wrong. (I'm not. Phew.)

First, if you actually spend time and read Sunstein's 30-odd pages, you realize this is, in fact, a purely intellectual exercise (as I said before), and a quite interesting one at that. It's a great primer on conspiracy theories, how they work, why they thrive, and whether or not they require a public policy response. He even stipulates that his (and a co-author's) suggestions should only be taken assuming a "(real or imagined) well-motivated government," that is, one acting on the interest of the public welfare and under a system of extensive civil liberties. (See p. 16.)

Greenwald wrongly interprets that quote to say Sunstein believes the current American government is well-motivated, but he -- like VM -- does not understand what an "intellectual exercise" is (logic arguments often begin, "assume X," for instance, though Esquire can probably talk about that better than I can). Early in the abstract, when Sunstein suggests the American government may "ban" conspiracy theories in "imaginable conditions," Greenwald angrily responds that no such thing can be done. It's weird -- it's as if he doesn't understand what "imagination" means, or the difference between possibility and reality. (And can he really not even imagine certain situations in which the government may have to restrict the First Amendment? What's wrong with this guy?)

Second, Sunstein's scariest idea -- the "cognitive infiltration" of groups -- turns out to be fairly innocuous. Out of the entire paper, it occupies only a page (from 21 to 22), and includes extensive caveats that Greenwald conveniently ignores in his tirade. The argument boils down to this: Sunstein does not think that conspiracy theories -- which must be false and harmful, as well as display narrow, distinctive features -- can be rebutted with counter-evidence that observe standard epistemological conventions (he offers a range of mind-boggling examples related to the 9/11 Truth movement).

Instead, he suggests the government agents "might enter chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups" and raise doubts about the factual premises of conspiracy theories. That might be worrying to those with even a casual knowledge of the history of domestic surveillance in this country. But Sunstein gets that too: he suggests one variant, in which "Arabic-speaking Muslim officials from the State Department" identify themselves and chat in Islamist networks. (I know: how dare he! What utter fascist madness!)

Yes, he also suggests government officials may also do the same anonymously, acknowledging that the method carries greater risks. Nowhere does Sunstein suggest this is the only and best and fool-proof way to combat conspiracy theories; he says -- looking at the evidence cited in this paper, with references to the latest sociological and legal data -- the American government may consider doing something, knowing fully the risks (which includes an abuse of power), if faced with a particularly dangerous situation. Sunstein's paper should be taken fully in the context of the current war against Islamist extremists, who thrive on their own conspiracy theories to recruit thousands of followers. To bar an academic from studying the phenomenon, or suggesting possible solutions, sounds downright ridiculous to me.

(Note, also, that law enforcement authorities already uses a similar method regularly, deploying informers and undercover agents to crack terror cells and hard cases.) If you have time only to read one page of this paper, read the one Greenwald's most angry about -- p. 22 -- and you will see what I mean about the academic tone of Sunstein's argument.

Finally, consider Greenwald's own errors. He compares Sunstein's suggestions to particular Bush Administration episodes (many of which Sunstein actually unfavorably cites in his paper). But those actions -- paying a think tank to disagree with a particular view on climate change, for instance -- would not qualify under Sunstein's program, since he's concerned with potentially violent and pernicious conspiracy theories, not Administration policies (and he specifically notes that the anti-global warming crowd -- as well as Santa Claus -- do not count).

Greenwald then weirdly condemns the American government for planting pro-U.S. stories in Iraqi newspapers during the height of the insurgency there. Sunstein discusses the episode (see p. 27) and makes some good points: first, he concedes the effort may have failed because the connection to the U.S. government was discovered, thereby blunting its value. But he also notes that the affair took place during an intensely violent war in a foreign country, where many American rights and conventions do not always apply (does Greenwald think that the American government cannot even drop pro-U.S. leaflets from the sky to demoralize the enemy?). Finally, Sunstein notes that conspiracy theories often thrive in foreign countries with a low level of civil liberties, and in a malfunctioning marketplace of ideas, the United States might have to ensure that its side at least has a presence in the public sphere.

But, again, the tone here is completely academic: he discusses the drawbacks of, say, banning an anti-American newspaper (as Paul Bremer did in 2004), calling it an immensely complicated question (see p. 28). For Greenwald -- and VM -- there's no gray whatsoever, and there's not even a need to consider this profoundly complex problem (even though it's come up again and again for the American government fighting a war). Why bother, when you can ring up an intellectual witch-hunt instead?

Please, when you have the time, read the paper. And, please, dismiss Greenwald's bigger conclusion: that academics who try to confront difficult issues be banned from public service for doing so (a strikingly anti-free speech position, if I ever heard one).

Good night,

B.

P.S. Please also see my other angry post of the night; my latest comment on our fascism obsession in VM's original post about this subject last week.

Fascism, According To The Dude

With the F-word annoyingly popping up on television, everyday conversation and -- the final straw -- this esteemed blog, I thought I'd show you my definition. (I call it the "Stay Out Of Malibu" wing.)

Defending the KSM Trial

I'm not going to do the defending (because I know far too little on the subject). I'll let Jack Goldsmith and Jim Comey, two Bush-era attorneys, do some of the talking in this WaPo editorial:

In deciding to use federal court, the attorney general probably considered the record of the military commission system that was established in November 2001. This system secured three convictions in eight years. The only person who had a full commission trial, Osama bin Laden's driver, received five additional months in prison, resulting in a sentence that was shorter than he probably would have received from a federal judge.

One reason commissions have not worked well is that changes in constitutional, international and military laws since they were last used, during World War II, have produced great uncertainty about the commissions' validity. This uncertainty has led to many legal challenges that will continue indefinitely -- hardly an ideal situation for the trial of the century.

I find the whole debate on this subject increasingly detached from reality. It strikes me as patently absurd that all terrorists demand a trial in federal courts, when the circumstances and their crimes may not warrant such a thing. I'm happy enough with at least a habeus corpus hearing to ensure that the government justifies indefinite detention for the most serious cases. Apparently, the President shares this view, if you believe this incredibly interesting account of his views on terrorism in the New York Times magazine. (I know it's long, and we all have things to do in our lives that prove we're productive members of society, but at least take a look at the introduction, which covers the worrying signs that Obama or Washington, D.C., would be attacked during the inauguration.)

It simply seems better to take things by each case, and determine the proper procedure from there.

Susan Rice at the U.N...

If this characterization is true, it's kind of surprising given the administration's stated belief in the centrality and importance of the U.N to U.S. and World Policy.

TNR on Obama moving forward...

This is a pretty insightful analysis by John B. Judis of the The New Republic on the meaning of Massachusetts and what it portends for Obama. I disagree with a number of his claims, but even so his reasoning is defensible.

Scott Brown for President!

A reader at the Corner notes that if Scott Brown wins in Massachusetts, Brown's experience echoes the current occupant of the White House (which is scary to me):

E-mail:

Hey Rich. I haven't seen anyone point out that if Scott Brown wins, he's the logical choice for the nominee for President in 2012. A state senator, followed by 2 years of experience in the US Senate! Aren't those the job requirements now?

UPDATE

E-mail:


"A state senator, followed by 2 years of experience in the US Senate! Aren't those the job requirements now?"

I'm not so sure. Was Brown ever a community organizer?

Also he needs to be careful not to actually *serve* in the US Senate, but rather to start running for President tomorrow morning and show up for his day job as little as humanly possible. That will help him avoid any inconvenient legislative fingerprints for the haters to pick away at. (Come to think of it, his actual service in the state legislature, where he worked instead of just killing time until he could reach for the next rung on the ladder, may disqualify him entirely.)

The Legacy of Comte's Big Ideas

The most recent Weekly Standard has an excellent article up by Hoover Institute fellow (and UVA professor) James Ceaser, about Auguste Comte's Religion of Humanity and its applicability to the Obama movement. An excerpt:

There is therefore a need for an explanation that goes beyond the conventional one. When the history of this period is written, the 2008 campaign will almost certainly be seen as a watershed event in cultural history, above and beyond any connection it had to American politics, when a worldwide movement congealed to display its enthusiasm for Barack Obama. This perspective will also require a reassessment of the place of Obama. To be sure, the campaign will continue in one respect to be regarded as being all about Obama. This has been Obama’s perception, and understandably so. Only the most rare of persons, after being the object for over a year of such unrelenting adulation, could have resisted the temptation to think that the world revolved around him. Barack Obama is clearly not that person. His speeches and remarks are filled with references to himself in a ratio that surpasses anything yet seen in the history of the American presidency. But in another respect, the 2008 campaign was about something much larger than Barack Obama. The character of the event will not be grasped until the focus begins to shift from Barack Obama to the yearning for Barack Obama. It is in the thoughts and actions of those who adored him that the most interesting and important dimension of the campaign took place.


The rise of the Religion of Humanity is what best describes this event. This strange term designates an actual sect, now defunct, that enjoyed a considerable following and prestige in intellectual circles in the 19th century. John Stuart Mill was a prominent convert, pronouncing the “culte de l’humanité [to be] capable of fully supplying the place for a religion, or rather (to say the truth) of being a religion.” In America, where the religion wore the respectable label of the “Church of Humanity,” the acolytes included the well-known journalist David Croly and his son Herbert, the founder and longtime editor of the New Republic. If it were not for the Religion of Humanity, Americans today might not have the pleasure of reading Jonathan Chait on “The Rise of Republican Nihilism” or E.J. Dionne “In Praise of Harry Reid.”

Mill and Croly were both intellectual disciples of the French social philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Though rarely studied in America today, Comte bequeathed an enormous legacy. He was the first to simplify and popularize the idea of a progressive movement of history, which he described as proceeding through three great epochs: the age of theological thinking, the age of metaphysical thinking, and the age of scientific or “Positivistic” thinking. (“Positivism,” referring to the scientific mindset and approach, was one of Comte’s many linguistic inventions.) The inevitable march of humanity (still with a small h) through these stages, albeit at different rates in different places, was the great story of history. Variations among nations and groups might continue, but they paled in significance next to the common destiny of humanity. Those who continued to view the world in terms of nations and their conflicts—Comte called them “retrogrades”—were caught in old thinking, unable to grasp the new global order being formed by the forces generated by Positivism.

Comte argued that it was time to expand man’s scientific knowledge of the physical world to the social realm. A new science of society, “sociology” (Comte’s term), was the latest and highest of all the sciences. Possession of knowledge of the laws of social movement was what ideally bestowed the title to rule. Comte and his circle were never much impressed by democracy and favored instead one system or another of governance by experts. (Saint-Simon, for whom Comte worked for many years, once proposed running society with “Councils of Newton.”)

But there was an important twist to Comte’s praise of science. In contrast to many who thought that the scientific method and scientific values were sufficient to bind society together, Comte insisted that people had to believe. As faith in the transcendent was no longer -possible in the Positivist age, he called for “replacing God with Humanity.” The aim of this religion without God was to build a global community that assured the betterment of man’s lot. Postulating this objective as an ideal is what Comte meant by Humanity (now with a capital H).

The whole article is well worth reading, even if you don't ascribe to notions about Big Ideas (though I do). It makes an interesting case at the least. And I wouldn't be me if I didn't mention that this echoes a lot of what one J.G. Oldberg wrote about in a litttle discussed work known as "Liberal Fascism"...

Inside CIA Interrogations and de-briefings...

This is a pretty fascinating read into how the CIA really operates (or did at least). The short summary: It's nothing like Jack Bauer or the North Vietnamese.

Fascism We Can Believe In

I’ve never given Glenn Greenwald the benefit of the doubt. His brand of self-righteousness used to rub me the wrong way. Well, that is until I realized his arguments are sound. I've also started to realize that his Salon column is a must-read for those looking for an honest broker of the various political debates. There’s a lot on which we disagree, but I respect his courage and fairness.

Why do I say courage? Well, among other things, he’s not afraid to systematically dismantle the tortured logic of many of his natural allies, be they Nobel-laureates or otherwise. And I say fair because he's someone who generally believes in the social benefits of government intervention into our lives, yet agitates with the best of them when government fails at that intervention. For example, he's recently argued that the warm relationship between Congress and Wall Street is the complete opposite of what capitalism entails; these bedfellows create an environment of crony capitalsim, rife with abuse and corruption.

All of which brings me to this great column, where he shows us just how dangerous well-intentioned interventions can be. His piece explores a proposal that advocates a covert government dissemination program, similar to the progoganda programs of the previous Bush administration. In a recent paper by the author, he suggests that undercover government agents should spread the official government line via the internet in order to tamp down on harmful “conspiracy theories.”

The first thought that comes to my mind? Creepy.

Here’s the story: Cass Sunstein, one of Obama's closest advisors, wants the administration to use something called “cognitive infiltration,” which, the author says, is “designed to introduce informational diversity into [extremist groups] and to expose indefensible conspiracy theories.” Translation: Sunstein proposes that government officials monitor and penetrate online “extremist” platforms – chat rooms, social networks, online forums, basically all of the internet – with the sole purpose of debunking so-called “conspiracy theories” with “corrective information” from the government.

I am not making this stuff up. Yikes.

I agree with Greenwald: this is a terrible idea. Greewald goes further and questions the very existence of this proposal. Why, he asks, was the paper's author put in charge of the Obama administration’s information technology policies? Moreover, when a top Obama advisor advocates covertly squashing free speech, why does it all of a sudden make for good public policy? Greenwald argues that when the Bush administration paid people to covertly spout the government line – think Armstrong Williams and Maggie Gallagher – they were shamefully exposed and the administration rightfully lambasted. What's different this time?

(By the way, Sunstein's paper does a grand job of defining “conspiracy theory” and “extremist” in a way that would have included all of our historical civil rights heroes, investigative journalists, anti-war protesters, and government watchdogs, just to name a few. Also, what in the world is an “indefensible conspiracy theory?” Does it differ from a “defensible” conspiracy theory? And who decides?)

Overall, Greenwald's piece belongs to the canon of must-reads. But be warned: the piece isn't perfect. He doesn't take his argument to its logical conclusion. That is, Greenwald neglects to use the word that encapsulates the kind of authoritarian behavior Sunstein advocates.

That word? Fascism.