Taken To Extremes

From The Daily Dish, an excerpt of a Tea Party blogger's recent post:

"Muslim Day at Six Flags is inappropriate for a multitude of reasons and I'm saddened and shocked by the ignorance of the Corporate folks and by the action that now must be taken by the rest of us. ... Islam is dying in America because Americans are learning (finally) what Muslims are about, what their 'faith' is based upon, how they're recruited, how they prey on the weak, their idea of 'rights' how they cannot ever respect our constitution because it's in direct violation with Sharia and how they must abide by a set of laws called dualism, compelling them to lie to others.

[...]

STOP placating them - in addition, there is no such thing as a moderate muslim, regardless of what you've heard - from the mouth of the son of a well known Imam. Islam is as Islam does. And Regardless of what you might think, there is no such thing of a 'mild' muslim, even the 'quiet' ones who live on the street corner, drive the BMW and work in the dr's office...they go to mosque, satisfy the pillars, pray, etc...and the money they are giving, that is funding terror.

Counter Gingrich

I think it's important to supply some countervailing evidence to Gingrich's thesis. Here are two long articles; I posted the first one a while back, but I think it's a compelling repudiation to the notion that Muslims have overrun Western Civilization in Europe.

"The New Inquisition," The Nation: http://www.thenation.com/article/new-inquisition?page=full

An excerpt:

Caldwell also suggests that Muslims are far more likely to commit violence against women. Under the heading "Virginity and violence," he writes that "there were forty-five [honor killings] in Germany alone in the first half of the decade." Since the argument here is that Muslims are more inclined to commit homicides against women in the context of "some trespass against sexual propriety," it would have been helpful if Caldwell had included, for the sake of contrast, the number of ethnic German women killed in incidents of domestic violence, as well as numbers for an entirely distinct and recent immigrant group, such as Eastern Europeans. Without such empirical comparisons, it is difficult to see how he can reach the conclusion he does, which is that "such acts make law. They assert sovereignty over a certain part of European territory for a different sexual regime." The label "honor killing" makes violence against women and girls sound like an exotic import rather than the pernicious and all-too-frequent reality that it is. Caldwell doesn't mention that domestic violence has been treated as a criminal problem in Europe thanks to the work of European feminists in the 1960s and '70s, and that now European Muslim feminists are working to create a similar zero-tolerance level about honor killings. Encouragingly, a recent Gallup study found that Muslims in Paris, Berlin and London disapproved of honor killings and crimes of passion about as much as the general French, German and British populations.

And this is Noah Feldman's piece on shariah. I don't know anything about this subject. Take it for what it's worth: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html

Speaking of Gingrich...

Here's a video of his speech today at the American Enterprise Institute. I thought it was excellent (he is an excellent orator.). He does also briefly address the Cordoba House issue, explaining his perspective. I agree with him that its origin lies in politics more than religious piety, though I still side with Berchmann's on the idea that when it comes to the application of our principles, it's largely irrelevant what other countries (such as Saudi Arabia) do.

Anyway, I quibble with several arguments he makes (particularly about the war strategy in Afghanistan), but I think he makes a powerful broader argument. I particularly agree with him about Sharia.

The speech is roughly an hour long, but well worth watching if only for the the discussion it engenders. It's titled "America at Risk: Camus, National Security, and Afghanistan."

Return To Cordoba House Debate, Please

Just posted a reply in the comments section to your two comments on the Cordoba House project, Esquire. Please see and reply when you can. Thanks.

McCarthy on AZ Decision...

And here's conservative legal scholar Andy McCarthy on the ruling. I'm indifferent to the political analysis at the end, but the legal remarks themselves are interesting. (Again, this is from NRO's Corner)

On a quick read, the federal court's issuance of a temporary injunction against enforcement of the major provisions of the Arizona immigration law appears specious.


In essence, Judge Susan Bolton bought the Justice Department's preemption argument — i.e., the claim that the federal government has broad and exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and therefore that any state measure that is inconsistent with federal law is invalid. The Arizona law is completely consistent with federal law. The judge, however, twisted to concept of federal law into federal enforcement practices (or, as it happens, lack thereof). In effect, the court is saying that if the feds refuse to enforce the law the states can't do it either because doing so would transgress the federal policy of non-enforcement ... which is nuts.

The judge also employs a cute bit of sleight-of-hand. She repeatedly invokes a 1941 case, Hines v. Davidowitz, in which the Supreme Court struck down a state alien-registration statute. In Hines, the high court reasoned that the federal government had traditionally followed a policy of not treating aliens as "a thing apart," and that Congress had therefore "manifested a purpose ... to protect the liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national system" that would not unduly subject them to "inquisitorial practices and police surveillance." But the Arizona law is not directed at law-abiding aliens in order to identify them as foreigners and subject them, on that basis, to police attention. It is directed at arrested aliens who are in custody because they have violated the law. And it is not requiring them to register with the state; it is requiring proof that they have properly registered with the federal government — something a sensible federal government would want to encourage.

Judge Bolton proceeds from this misapplication of Hines to the absurd conclusion that Arizona can't ask the federal government for verification of the immigration status of arrestees — even though federal law prohibits the said arrestees from being in the country unless they have legal status — because that would tremendously burden the feds, which in turn would make the arrestees wait while their status is being checked, which would result in the alien arrestees being treated like "a thing apart."

The ruling ignores that, in the much later case of Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Supreme Court has emphasized that

Although the State has no direct interest in controlling entry into this country, that interest being one reserved by the Constitution to the Federal Government, unchecked unlawful migration might impair the State's economy generally, or the State's ability to provide some important service. Despite the exclusive federal control of this Nation's borders, we cannot conclude that the States are without power to deter the influx of persons entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns. [Emphasis added.]

Furthermore, as Matt Mayer of the Heritage Foundation notes, the Fifth Circuit federal appeals court similarly held in Lynch v. Cannatella (1987) that "No statute precludes other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies from taking other action to enforce this nation's immigration laws."

However this ruling came out, it was only going to be the first round. Appeal is certain. But the gleeful Left may want to put away the party hats. This decision is going to anger most of the country. The upshot of it is to tell Americans that if they want the immigration laws enforced, they are going to need a president willing to do it, a Congress willing to make clear that the federal government has no interest in preempting state enforcement, and the selection of judges who will not invent novel legal theories to frustrate enforcement. They are not going to get that from the Obama/Reid/Pelosi Democrats.

Levin on the AZ decision

I was on the road all day and so haven't had the chance to read up much about it, but I thought this response from Mark Levin (the ascerbic radio host and former Justice Department/White House lawyer) on the AZ decision is interesting:

(From NRO's Corner)

This is a typical example of a judge stating the correct legal standard, but then ignoring it and applying the test in a fashion completely divorced from the facts of the case in order to reach a predetermined decision.


First, the court states correctly that the sort of constitutional challenge brought here — a facial challenge — is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully. It requires that the plaintiff (here the federal government) must demonstrate that the law can never be applied in a constitutional fashion. The test cannot be met with hypothetical arguments — yet that is exactly what the court relies on in its ruling: the assertion that the AZ law will impose an impermissible burden on law enforcement, which is to determine the legal status of a person detained pursuant to the AZ law on the reasonable suspicion that the person is in the country illegally. The court does not provide any empirical basis to support its conclusion. It’s pure supposition.

As the court notes, the burden a party must meet when engaging in a facial challenge of a given statute is established in United States v. Salerno. The court pays lip service to Salerno at the beginning of its analysis on the “likelihood of success on the merits,” but then proceeds to ignore the Salerno principles.

The court cites Salerno when it notes: “A facial challenge must fail where a statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” In deciding a facial challenge, courts “must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or imaginary cases.” Then the court doesn’t even attempt to actually analyze the provisions it overturns within the Salerno context, except in one instance — in fn. 18 — where it upholds a provision of SB 1070.

Distinguish the facial challenge from an as-applied challenge. At one point the court engages in a hypothetical example, when it talks about a potential unfair burden on a legal alien failing to have a dog on a leash, wondering whether he could be detained and subject to an impermissible burden for not carrying his papers under that circumstance. (The court talks about John Doe, a legal alien from Chile who was walking his dog without a leash and was stopped by Sheriff Smith and detained at the local jail for eight hours while his status was checked. It didn’t actually happen.)

The judge also worries that increasing the time a person is detained while his immigration status is being determined might be unconstitutional. Again, pure speculation. (Moreover, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has already found that such a delay is permissible where there is reasonable suspicion to check a person’s status.)

In the bulk of its legal analysis, the court applies a selective reading of the case to an incomplete reading of the statute. In particular, respecting the provision related to confirming a person’s legal status, the court largely ignores the requirement that law-enforcement officers are able to confirm a person’s legal status only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a person is in the country illegally. The judge essentially omits the reasonable-suspicion component of the law and concludes that the act implements a new set of immigration rules particular to Arizona, in violation of a case called Hines v. Davidowitz.

Hines is an old case dealing with a vastly different Pennsylvania law. Here’s what the Hines court correctly concluded: “The question whether a state law is invalid as conflicting with Federal laws touching the same subject is not to be determined according to any rigid formula or rule, but depends upon whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

The Pennsylvania act required every alien 18 years or over, with certain exceptions, to register once each year; provide such information as is required by the statute, plus any “other information and details” that the Department of Labor and Industry may direct; pay $1 as an annual registration fee; receive an alien identification card and carry it at all times; show the card whenever it may be demanded by any police officer or agent of the Department of Labor and Industry, and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to registering a motor vehicle in his name or obtaining a license to operate one. The Department of Labor and Industry is charged with the duties of classifying the registrations for “the purpose of ready reference,” and furnishing a copy of the classification to the Pennsylvania Motor Police. Nonexempt aliens who fail to register are subject to a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or both. For failure to carry an identification card or for failure to show it upon proper demand, the punishment is a fine of not more than $10, or imprisonment for not more than 10 days, or both.

"Our conclusion,” said the court, “is that [the challenger of the PA law] is correct in his contention that the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously existing concurrent power of state and nation, but that whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.” Hines does not support the court’s conclusion respecting the AZ statute. That case clearly deals with an entirely new legal regime. AZ’s statute merely complements the federal statutory scheme.

Amazingly, today’s decision does not provide any substantive analysis of the very high standards required for mounting a successful facial challenge. The judge thinks certain events or difficulties will occur, and then uses her thoughts as a substitute for empirical evidence. The fact is that the AZ law does not create any new or additional federal responsibilities. It does not establish any new or inconsistent obligations for aliens legally or illegally residing in or otherwise found in Arizona. And. unlike the Hines case so prominent in the court’s ruling, Arizona’s law does not establish any new or extra forms, registration procedures, or other obligations for aliens, legal or illegal.

Respecting preemption, which is the substantive core of the federal government’s case, once again the court presents no evidence in support of its conclusion that AZ is likely to impermissibly interfere with federal law on multiple fronts, including the requirement that aliens carry papers or that state and local law enforcement may undertake constitutionally proper inquiries into the legal status of those they stop. AZ isn’t requiring the federal government to do anything. The federal government can choose not to take AZ’s calls and not cooperate. The court has essentially parroted the federal government’s claims about burdens.

Moreover, the federal government does not “occupy the field” in any event. Indeed, as a matter of federal law and long-standing practice, it encourages states to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law — both in practice and law. In fact, it relies heavily on them.

Federal preemption can be either express or implied: express where the Constitution says so (declaration of war), implied by conflict with federal law. In the immigration context, implied preemption exists only 1) if a statute falls into the narrow category of a “regulation of immigration”; 2) if Congress expressed “the clear and manifest purpose"”of completely occupying the field and displacing all state activity; or 3) if the state regulation conflicts with federal laws such that it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (De Canas v. Bica). Federal immigration law does not preempt AZ law, and the authors of the AZ law were well acquainted with the pitfalls they needed to avoid — and avoided them.

I think the word “abomination” does not overstate this court’s decision.

— Mark Levin is president of Landmark Legal Foundation, which has filed an amicus brief in this case.

Mickey Kaus on JournoList...

Another take on Journolist, from blogger (and current Democratic candidate for Senate in California! Go Mickey Go!). More accurately, he's responding to a piece from Riehan Salam, but same difference.

The comforts and dangers of not taking a stand.

The message of this seems like advice I should consider. Thought I'd post it here since it's kind of an interesting argument.

An essay on the dangers of critical reason and the fear of erroring.

Sen. Webb on Affirmative Action...

Some good insights in this WSJ guest column by Sen. Jim Webb (D, Va.). Some factoids that I wasn't aware of too.  (Only 5% of Southerners owned slaves at the time of the Civil War? I knew the super-wealthy owned a majority, but didn't realize it was that severe).

I'll withhold the obligatory (but in jest!) anti-Irish Protestant comments that the article raises in my mind though.

(Despite my Irish Catholic heritage, one of my best friends is Orange Irish...I have yet to figure out why I haven't had him killed yet...)

FP take on 90,000 leaked classified docs about Afghanistan...

A number of good links in here in a blog from Foreign Policy magazine. (Including an unrelated link redirection to a lot of articles about Journo-List that Berchmans will no doubt pretend aren't there....I kid, I kid).

It's late here, so I won't write any more now. Perhaps later, young padewans.

Language and Reality...

You may have seen this guest column in the WSJ. Fascinating conversation about how the differences in languages affect our understandings of reality and our behavior.

Conservative Political Correctness

I don't mean to sound like a naive hippie, but the continued bout of public opposition to mosque-building around the United States really, really gets my goat (it's 2 in the morning where I am, so forgive the chatty tone). There are three points I want to quickly make:

1. I find it hilarious that several conservative commentators, including ex-office holders like Newt Gingrich (and current political candidates), have argued that building mosques in America should be contingent on the conduct of Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East (especially Saudi Arabia, which apparently doesn't show as much respect for "people of the Book" as prescribed). This is funny to me for two reasons: A) It's ludicrous to suggest that time-honored (some would say "natural") principles like freedom of religion and association should be defined based on the question, "What Would Saudi Arabia Do?" But B) it's especially silly for conservatives, who generally take the "originalist" approach to constitutional interpretation, to take this position, not only because the Constitution doesn't really endorse Gingrich's curious argument, but also because conservatives generally have a dim view of what foreign countries and jurisprudence can offer to their own.

2. OK, so Gingrich is an easy target, and I should move on. But then, Sarah Palin posted another item on her Facebook about the proposed mosque near the World Trade Center, which then splashed across all the (left-wing, pinko, biased, slanderous, anti-Palin) media websites I read (that is, they all reported, without being able to question Palin, what she said -- ah, the perfect megaphone). Basically, the ex-governor conceded that Muslims had a right to worship where they wanted (how kind), but asked them to 'refudiate' the project because the wounds of 9/11 were still too raw. In a nutshell, her message is a paean to political correctness, that supposed conservative bugaboo: please, your right to practice your religion, even though a firmly ingrained principle of our Constitution, hurts people's feelings, and we wouldn't want to offend anyone, now would we? (I always find it curious when conservatives bash 'political correctness' that they don't want to admit that they have their own set of taboos and speak-no-evils.)

3. I've yet to see a better explanation as to why a project like the Cordoba House should not be allowed, other than Muslims worshiping may or may not worship the same God as the terrorists who blew up the Towers. The Weekly Standard, bless its heart, did recently put out an essay that purported to explore the deep, hidden radical views of the preacher leading the project. I'll let Robert Wright summarize my views on the piece:

Its latest issue features an article about Park51 chock full of angles that never would have occurred to me if some magazine had asked me to write an assessment of the project’s ideological underpinnings. For example: Rauf’s wife, who often speaks in support of the project and during one talk reflected proudly on her Islamic heritage, “failed to mention another feature of her background: She is the niece of Dr. Farooq Khan, formerly a leader of the Westbury Mosque on Long Island, which is a center for Islamic radicals and links on its Web site to the paramilitary Islamic Circle of North America (I.C.N.A.), the front on American soil for the Pakistani jihadist Jamaat e-Islami.”

Got that? Rauf’s wife has an uncle who used to be “a leader” of a mosque that now has a Web site that links to the Web site of an allegedly radical organization. (I’ll get back to the claim that the Westbury Mosque is itself a “center for Islamic radicals.”)

Wright's essay also includes a helpful distinction about views on Hamas. Read it in full. (By the way, Vade Mecon, it's good that you add a comment once or twice every other fortnight, but that doesn't really count for intellectual credibility much these days. Write, or get off the pot.)

The Journo-List Non-Scandal

I see conservatives are slowly losing their mind over Ezra Klein's former online cabal, the Journo-List. I'm not sure how the list can be used as evidence of widespread bias in the mainstream media; most of the names unearthed show that the participants are all opinion writers (I didn't count a single person in the top 15 of this list who is a good ol' fashioned objective journalist). It's absurd -- as if people of like-mind political leanings cannot join together and write each other about the goings on of the day. (And comparing Journo-List to the so-called "Climategate," another pseudo-scandal happily inflated by global warming quietists, also makes no sense -- have these opinion writers done anything to suggest skewering their coverage given that their coverage is meant to be skewered toward an opinion anyway?)

I'm angry about this dispute because I think it's an invasion of privacy and an attack on a profession that I studied for a year and a half in a very, very cold place (that you both of you will no doubt remember). We have long argued about whether or not journalists are capable of balance (I find it curious that conservatives believe judges can be even-handed and non-ideological, even though they instinctively believe journalists care more about their partisan agenda than earning a paycheck). But most journalists in this country do not work in Washington, and they do not cover the Obama Administration (I'd venture to say most do not even cover political issues, but particular beats like health, crime, etc .). It's really, really hard to be biased one way or another about whether or not a new traffic signal should be installed in X Township. (It's also really hard to feel motivated enough to convey this bias in print.)

At a time when easily edited videos (some, like those that supposedly exposed ACORN, taken under false pretenses) can masquerade as journalism, I think the need for people who at the very least ask all sides in a particular dispute for comment deserves a little more respect than currently on display.

The worth of Thais...

I thought this was an interesting piece in the Bangkok Post. A number of good, general principles that relate to the American ideal (and our view of human rights).

Why Do We Believe What We Believe

This Boston Globe article about facts and political beliefs has been making the rounds on the Interweb. It cites a growing sample of studies that show that American citizens -- and partisans -- do not change their minds when confronted with their own empirical ignorance of certain issues. Money quote:

Most of us like to believe that our opinions have been formed over time by careful, rational consideration of facts and ideas, and that the decisions based on those opinions, therefore, have the ring of soundness and intelligence. In reality, we often base our opinions on our beliefs, which can have an uneasy relationship with facts. And rather than facts driving beliefs, our beliefs can dictate the facts we chose to accept. They can cause us to twist facts so they fit better with our preconceived notions.

There are a number of great studies cited (one found that only 3 percent of 1,000 people surveyed in Illinois offered accurate answers on the state's welfare system). But while the article focuses on a neurological explanation, it also brought to mind an old question Vade Mecon posed when we were all shivering in Syracuse. That is, if I read everything Esquire did (and vice versa), could we imagine switching places on the spectrum or at least modifying them?

And, since I'm dismissive of all of V.M.'s suggestions, said no. Of course, at the time, I was in the thrall of communitarian literature (long live Michael Sandel!), and deeply suspicious of the reliance on the rationalist abstract individual so often posited in Western political philosophy. But I still hold on to a nugget: whatever I believe, I ascribe to culture, family, friends, years of growing up in certain communities. It's depressing in one sense, because no one likes to insult one's own mind; we'd all like to think we choose what we think after careful and deep consideration.

But what if everything was already decided for us?

Clarence Thomas And Impartial Juries

I was reading through Tom Goldstein's excellent review of the Supreme Court's term on Scotusblog. It received a lot of attention when it came out, and I think anyone in need of evidence that the Supreme Court isn't just a political tug-of-war should read it. (In brief: roughly 50 percent of cases before SCOTUS are dealt with unanimously; of the other half, only one in 12 go down to 5-4, and of those, even a smaller number are decided along conservative-liberal lines.)

But in one of those unanimous decisions -- Berghuis v. Smith -- Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that has startled a few people (including me). The opinion is very brief -- barely two pages -- but he basically says he'd be willing to revisit the Court's precedent that juries should have a fair cross-section of society. Now, the reasoning relates partially to my problem with originalism and its 18th-century fetishism. Here's what Thomas writes:

The text of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by “an impartial jury.” Historically, juries did not include a sampling of persons from all levels of society or even from both sexes. See, e.g. , Alschuler & Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 877 (1994) (In 1791, “[e]very state limited jury service to men; every state except Vermont restricted jury service to property owners or taxpayers; three states permitted only whites to serve; and one state, Maryland, disqualified atheists”); Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U. S. 522 , n. 13 (1975) (“In this country women were disqualified by state law to sit as jurors until the end of the 19th century”). The Court has nonetheless concluded that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a jury that represents “a fair cross section” of the community. Ante , at 1 (citing Taylor , supra ).

In my view, that conclusion rests less on the Sixth Amendment than on an “amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ,” Duren v. Missouri , 439 U. S. 357, 372 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and seems difficult to square with the Sixth Amendment ’s text and history. Accordingly, in an appropriate case I would be willing to reconsider our precedents articulating the “fair cross section” requirement. But neither party asks us to do so here, and the only question before us is whether the state court’s disposition was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, our precedents. See ante , at 23, 810; 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). I concur in the Court’s answer to that question.

I admire the fidelity to the text, sure, but this seems a bit extreme, no? I have two problems: first, is Thomas suggesting that it would be constitutional for a statute that barred women or minorities from serving on juries, since that was common practice when the Founders roamed the Earth? And secondly, knowing the problems and history of jury selection, and the insidious role race often played, is it wrong to think that a "fair cross section" of society will most likely yield an "impartial jury," as the Sixth Amendment demands?

Can anyone explain this to me?

Jon Kyl And Deficits

The liberal blogosphere has thrown a fit over Jon Kyl's recent remarks on tax cuts and "off-setting." The exact quotes:

"[Y]ou should never raise taxes in order to cut taxes," Jon Kyl said on Fox News Sunday. "Surely Congress has the authority, and it would be right to -- if we decide we want to cut taxes to spur the economy, not to have to raise taxes in order to offset those costs. You do need to offset the cost of increased spending, and that's what Republicans object to. But you should never have to offset cost of a deliberate decision to reduce tax rates on Americans."

There are a couple of problems here: first, it belies the notion that Republicans -- well, at least Kyl -- are serious at all about deficits. If the deficit were your chief concern, then raising taxes should be on the table at some point (rather than the 'never' that Kyl envisions).

Secondly, it shows -- partly -- why we've gotten to the dire fiscal situation we have. One side refuses, almost on principle, to admit that cutting taxes at every juncture (that is: a) when the economy is doing badly, we should cut taxes to stimulate growth, and b) when the economy is doing well (circa 2000), we should cut taxes again because the government has no business having a budget surplus), all while refusing to seriously contain spending (indeed, the Republicans came out as Medicare's chief defenders during the health care reform bill). Finally, as Ezra Klein points out, this leaves the mantle of responsible checkbook-ing with the other guys on the left:

This is much crazier than anything you hear from Democrats. Imagine if some Democrat -- and a member of the Senate Democratic leadership, no less -- said that as a matter of principle, spending should never be offset. He'd be laughed out of the room.

Now, the supply-siders and Laffer enthusiasts among us will reply that cutting taxes generates growth on their own, which then results in higher tax revenue (magical in its simplicity). I don't believe it, but we can trade statistics on that in the comments section.

I get the impression that this article...

was written by someone who is new to the issues being discussed.

But (and I'm sincerely asking here) what does this mean:

Two years ago, the court declared for the first time that the gun rights of individuals were protected by the Constitution. This year, the justices made clear this was a "fundamental" right that extended to cities and states as well as federal jurisdictions.

??? Haven't protected individual gun rights as a broad idea been established since the Bill of Rights was written? The debate is over periphery of what those rights mean; not whether the right to gun ownership exists at all...

Lastly, I find it tedious to hear the notion that cancelling out prior decisions and returning to a prior standard is the same thing as creating a brand new standard. That strikes me as a logical fail...(I'm not using this as an argument that the Roberts Court is ipso facto always doing so; merely that lots and lots of commentators seem to suggest that such a notion is impossible.

I'm reminded of William F. Buckley's famous remark on the distinct methods of pushing old ladies....